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TWETTEN

HOW SAVE AQUI AS ' S
"INTELLECTUS ESSENTIAE ARGUMENT"
FOR THE REAL DISTINCTION
BETWEEN ESSENCE A D ESSE?

Aquinas so-called "Intellect11s essentiae Argument" for the distinction be
tween being and essence is notoriously suspect, including among defenders of
Aquinas ' distinction. For this volume, I take as my starting point the recent
defense of the argument by Fr. Lawrence Dewan. Dewan ' s papers on topics
such as individuation, divine names, and formal causality are magisterial, un
surpassed in the literature. By contrast, I shall argue, Dewan's two papers de
fending Aquinas arguments for the real distinction between esse and essence
are unsuccessful. evertheless, pointing out some shortcomings in his read
ings will allow me to take up his call to highlight the "formal' or " quidditative
side" of Aquinas ' metaphysics, in this case in regard to the proofs of the 'real
distinction." Accordingly, the second half of this paper sets forth a way in
which the famous "Intellectus essentiae Argument" of De ente et essentia 4 can
succeed as a proof of the real distinction. If Aquinas ' reasoning in this most
contentious of his proofs can be saved, so, perhaps, can most of his other proofs.

I. DEW A

ON THE REAL DISTINCTION

AND FORMAL CAUSALITY

The most recent of Dewan's two papers, published in Gregorian um 1999,
presents Dewan's favorite way of establishing the real distinction. I can atDAVID 1\VETTEN, PhD - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University, Wisconsin,
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test to this enduring favoritism based on many long discussions with him on
the topic, the last at Fordham in 2010. The Gregoriam,111 paper proposes' to
explain ' 1 the real distinction between form and being: how we know they are
really distinct, given that they are related so closely that they are - and
should be (p. xi)- easily confused (188) . The paper is a meditation on pas
sages from Aquinas especially these three: Exp osition on Boethius ' D e heb
domadibus 2, Su111111a contra Gentiles 2.52 (n. 6 Amplius . Substantia), and
Quodlib etal Qu estions 12 .4 .1. Dewan finds the extended argument in the
Exposition BDH, which turns on the simp licity of esse first seen in predica
tion, to be excessively dialectical or logical, removed from things in their re
al being (196). To compensate, Dewan invokes, as the proper context for
reading this argument, the causal relation between creature and creator. Two
principles (from two texts), in particular, support this "move ' (1 90-91 ) :
( 1) only in caused or created things are form and being distinct (cf. Quaes
tiones de Q11olibet 2.2.1); (2) it belongs to the very notion of a caused thing
to be composed of essence and esse (cf. ST I.3. 7 ad 1). 2 Hence, Dewan sets
out to find how form and being (which are already from the outset evident to
the intellect, even if only in a confused way [ 191 - 92]), are understood as re
ally distinct once understood in light of superior causes . The result amounts
to a rereading of Aquinas ' "Effect to Cause Argument" 3 for the real distinc
tion (202), the fifth of the seven arguments offered in CG 2.52, in light of
Dewan's favorite text on the issue (202- 204): Quodlibetal Qu estions 12.4.1.
In fact, Dewan isolates a proof of the real distinction not previously identi
fied, which has been dubbed the "Causal Hierarchy Argument. " 4
In what follows , I lay out Dewan 's "Causal Hierarchy Argument." Ob
serve, first , that Dewan's argument is a "God to Creatures Argument" for the
1 I cite the slightly expanded version, Lawrence DEWAN, "St. Thomas and the Distinction be
tween Form and Esse in Caused Things," in IDEM, Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Meta 
physics , (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy) (Washington, DC: The Catholic
University of America Press, 2006), 188- 204 at 199; reprinted from Gregorianum 80 ( 1999)
353- 70.
2 Dewan gives an expansive reading to the text. For him, to be caused or created consists in
and reveals being composed of essence and esse. Aquinas ' point is that things are caused only
because they are composite, not that being caused is the reason for their composition, or for our
knowing their composition.
3 I have named it thus in my catalogue of Aquinas' nine arguments; David TWEITEN "Really
Distinguishing Essence from Esse," in Peter KWASNIEWSKJ (ed.), Wisdom 's Apprentice: Thomistic
Essays in Honor ofLawrence Dewan, OP. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2007), 40---84 at 62-4.
4 Gregory TRAYLOR, "Causal Arguments, Ontological Distinctions: Lawrence Dewan and the
Argument for the Real Distinction" (forthcoming).
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real distinction, an argument form ascribed to Aquinas in Leo Sweeney's
catalogue of the early arguments . The argument form has been given favored
status by authors of the stature of Fr. Owens 5 and Msgr Wippel. 6 The version
favored by Dewan, however, is based on Q1wdlibet 12.4.1.
I reduce Dewan 's reasoning to the fo llowing premises:
T HE CAUSA L H IERA RCHY A RGUMENT

(1) Creatures actually are' through an esse that participates in and has an ana
logous commonality with the divine subsistent esse.7

5 "[T]he real distinction between essence and existence cannot be known prior to the demon
stration of the existence of God. Being has to be established as a real nature before its real dis
tinction from the quiddity it actuates can be proven." Joseph OWENS, "Quiddity and Real Dis
tinction in St Thomas Aquinas,' Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965): 1- 22 at 19. See also IDEM, An El
ementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruc e, 1963), 70- 1, 101- 8; IDEM, Aquinas on Be
ing and Thing (Niagara Falls, N.Y.: iagara University Press, 198 1), 11; revised version: IDEM,
"Aquinas on Being and Thing," in Thomistic Papers, vol. 3, ed. Leonard Kennedy (Houston:
Center for Thomistic Studies, 1987), 3- 24, at 13; IDEM, " Stages and Distinction in De ente: A Re
j oinder," The Thomist 45 (198 1): 99-123, at 109-10; IDEM, "Aquinas' Distinction at De ente et
essentia 4.1 19-1 23," Mediaeval Studies 48 (1986): 264- 87, at 28 5, n. 42. For Owens, Gilson was
the first commentator to see that Aquinas' metaphysics differs from all others by taking existence
to be known first only in judgment, and by drawing out the consequences (IDEM, Aquinas on Be
ing and Thing, p. 18n). Any other reading (Wippel's and Fabro's are mentioned in this context)
results in esse's being conceived as a "thing" really distinct from essence (IDEM, "Aquinas' Dis
tinction," 284-5), a view cogently criticized by Suarez (IDEM, Aquinas on Being and Thing, 13,
19). For Fabro's denial that esse is known in judgment, see Cornelio FABRO, Participation et cau
salite selon S. Thomas d 'Aquin (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1961 ), 56, 61 3, and 75- 6. See also IDEM, "La problematica de llo esse tomistico," in IDEM, Tomismo e pensiero
moderno (Rome: Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1969), 103- 33, at 103; reprinted from Aqui
nas 2.2 (1959) 194-225.
6 Wippel gives a central, though, unlike Owens, not exclusive, role to "God to creatures" rea
soning, highlighting, of course, the value of the hypothetical variation of such reasoning: the rea
soning proceeds under the hypothesis that something whose nature is esse itself (God) exists, as is
found in "stage 2" of Aquinas' argument in De Ente 4; John WIPPEL, "Essence and Existence in
the De ente, Ch. 4)," in IDEM, Metaphysical Themes in St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 107-32 (substantially revised from IDEM,
"Aquinas 's Route to the Real Distinction: A Note on De ente et esseniia," The Thomist 43
[1979]: 279- 95). For Scott Mt\.CDONALD, "The Esse/Essentia Argument in Aquinas 's De ente et
essentia," Jo urnal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 157- 72 , the second stage is to be un
derstood as a sub-argument of the first stage, a third disjunct to be excluded. evenheless, for
MacDonald, unlike for Wippel, the first stage succeeds in showing the real distinction for every
case except that of something whose essence is identical to existence. It should be noted, how
ever, that MacDonald denies that there is an independent "l ntellectus essentiae Argument" in the
De ente.
See DE\VA_ ·,"St.Thomas and the Distinction between Form and Esse," esp. 201 , 203--4.
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(2) But creatures in the causal hierarchy are what they are through a fom1
or essence that is radically other than the divine essence, which is subsist
ent esse.
(3) Therefore, in creatures, esse and essence are really diverse.
One can certainly recognize in this argument the metaphysical wisdom of
Aquinas, as well as some of Dewan 's characteristic teachings: first , esse
names a quasi-common nature or intrinsic "formality ' in things by which
they are; and second, the formal cause of that esse in creatures is essence,
whereas its efficient cause is God. 8 Dewan himself highlights these features
in his own 2006 introduction to this paper and its reasoning:
My contention is that a healthy conception of form should tend to confuse it with
the act of being; th.is is precisely because of the kinship between the t\vo, i.e. the
intimate relationship I have been stressing in ... preceding papers. It is only by ap
preciating the implications of efficient causal hierarchy that the necessity to con
clude to a real distinction between form and esse in caused things is rightly seen.9

Still, does Dewan s ' Causal Hierarchy Argument" succeed? My concern
is a simple one: does not this argument beg the question by presupposing in
Premise ( 1) that creatures have esse in them as a really distinct component?
Premise (1) states: Creatures 'actually are' through an esse that participates
in and has an analogous commonality with the divine subsistent esse . In oth
er words, creatures ' actually are' through an esse that resembles but is not
God 's esse. If one denies that things have what I call ' Thomistic esse", even
while affirming form, matter, and essence, as would Averroes and Suarez ,
then Premise ( 1) is either false, or "esse' in Premise (1) may refer to the
same component as does Premise (2), in which case the conclusion does not
follow. In other words, if as for Premises (1) and (2), that by which creatures
actu ally are can also be that by which they are what they are ( as an Averroes
or a Suarez might hold), then the argument is inconclusive. The argument
points to grounds for thinking that creatures esse is other than divine esse and
that creatures' essence is other than divine essence, but it does not yet give
8 Dewan, of course, emphasizes those texts of Aquinas indicating that form is a cause of esse.
The act of being results from, is "through form ," and should not be thought of primarily as the
cause of form. See especially Lawrence Dewan, " St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the
Formal Cause," in IDEM, Form and Being, 168- 70 (reprinted from The New Scholasticism 63
[ 1989]: 173-82). There can be no question that this claim, for Dewan, is consistent with the fact
that God, subsistent esse, is the efficient cause of all creatures' esse.
9 D EWA_ ·, Form and Being, xi (emphasis mine).
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grounds for thinking that creatures' esse is other than creatures essence. One
could add premises stating, as is true for Thomas: what holds for essence,
holds for esse, which is the act by which the essence actually is. And so, if
creatures have finite essences, they also have finite esse. But nothing in the
argument yet shows that this esse is other than essence.
Suppose, on the other hand, one accepts Premises (I) and (2) as affirming
extramentally distinct principles in creatures in the way needed for the ar
gument to succeed . Is one not, in fact , accepting as a per se known or self
evident proposition Premise (4):

(4) The esse by which creatures actually are is other than the essence by
which they are what they are.
Perhaps Premise (4) states something as evident as this: just as it is self
evident that the number 2 is not the number 3, and a triangle is not a square,
it is self-evi dent that esse is not essence . Ironically, this is precisely what
Dewan had defended in his first paper on the real distinction, published in
Modern Schoolman 1984: na mely, that it is a p er se notwn that a creature's
esse is other than its essence. 10 The claim that the real distinction in crea
tures is grasped as a per se nofl1111 helps me make my point in what I call the
Question-Begging Objection. For, if the esse-essence real distinction crea
tures is grasped in a per se not111n in Premises ( 1) and (2) it would be circu
lar to use this fact to prove creatures' real distinction.
Of course, Dewan himself by 1999 has dropped his reading of the real
distinctio n as per se known. The main point of the 1984 paper, in any case,
is to argue against Fr. Owens ' claim that the first stage of De ente 4 's fa
mous argumentation, the "Intellectus essentiae Argument," is intended by
Thomas as establishing nothing more than a conceptu al distinction. What is
meant by esse (as in Premise [l]) is not what is meant by essence (as in
Premise [2]) . The concept of one is not in the concept of the other: they are
conceptually diverse. Fr. Dewan argues , and I shall agree, that the first stage
affirms a real or extramental distinction ( or "composition,' as Owens pre
fers). Dewan's most important point is that the subsequent second and third
stages both require a notion of esse such as is supplied alone by reasoning to
a real and not to a mere conceptual distinction. These stages are: (2 nd stage)
the proof that were there, ex hypothesi, a being lacking the "real distinction,'

10 Lawrence DEWAN, " St Thomas, Joseph Owens and the Real Distinction between Being and
Essence," The Modern Schoolman 61 (1984): 145-56, esp. 152-3.

 ˘ˇˆ˙˙˘˝˛°˜˙!�"""!#

$#

�

 

DAVID TWETI'EN

there could be only one such being· and (3 rd stage) the proof that there is
a being whose essence is esse, so that all other beings, including angels, must
receive their esse from the one subsistent esse . Dewan argues, in effect, that
these two stages fail if they use something like Suarez' notion of esse as on
ly conceptually distinct from essence (see esp. 153). If esse signifies es
sence, for example, as Thomas himself sometimes elsewhere admits it can, it
cannot be concluded that there is or can be only one thing whose esse is
identical to its essence. 11
Why then do most Thomists agree that the "lntellect11s essentiae Argu
ment ' fails to establish a real distinction? Let' s remind ourselves of the ar
gument. I quote the text of De ente 4 ' s first stage, inserting the premise num
bers that I then itemize below:
(Premise (1) ] Whatever does not belong to the understanding of an es
sence or quiddity [a] comes to it from outside and enters into com
position with the essence [and hence (b] is other than the essence] ; for
(Pn•mise (1.1)) no essence can be understood without its parts.
(Premise (2)) But every essence or quiddity can be understood without
understanding anything about its being (esse). I can understand, for in
stance, what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has
being in reality (esse in re). (Premise (3)) Therefore, it is clear that (a]
being is other than essence or qu iddity. Un less perhaps there is a thing
whose quiddity is its very being ... '
T HE " f N TELLECT US E SSE N TIAE ARGU M ENT'

( 1) Whatever does not belong to the understanding of a thing s essence
must (a) enter into composition with it [as (b) distinct from that es
sence] [whether the feature is caused by the essence itself or comes to
it from without].
( 1.1 ) For, no essence can be understood without its parts Uust as tri 
angle cannot be understood without 'three-sided ').
(2) But one can understand what is a human or a phoenix ( or an eclipse;
Sent. 2, d. 3.1.1) without knowing whether it has ' to be ' (esse) in reality.
(3) Therefore, the ' to be' of an essence [that exists] must (a) be distinct
from that essence.

11 If Dewan's succeeds in putting Owens' interpretation in doubt, it also succeeds in putting
into doubt Wippel ' s reading on which the second stage, not the first , establishes the real distinc
tion between esse and essence; see n. 6 above.
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The problem here is that Thomas apparently emphasizes our understand
ing of essence and our understanding of a thing's being . The obj ector points
out that it is illicit to infer from features of our understanding, such as that it
abstracts from existence, to features of reality. The fact that we consider
what something is without judging that it is te lls us little correspondingly
about its ontological status. Dewan (I 984), in my view, does not manage to
meet this objection. He grants (p. 149) that the real distinction is in the first
stage only "confusedly or imperfectly known ." He admits that it is charac
teristic of our abstractive knowledge that essences are grasped without
grasping actua l existence. But to ad mit this is to read the "Intellect11s essen 
tiae Argument" epistemologically, and to fail to read it, as Dewan himself
proposes to do, "as quidd itatively as possible."

II. PROPOSAL: TWO NEW PREMIS ES FOR THE PROOF S
OF THE "ESSENCE-ESSE' REAL DISTI CTION

In what follows , I propose a still more quidditative reading of De ente 4
than Dewan s. I draw attention, in effect, to two premises that Aquinas pre
supposes in the "Intellect us essentiae Argument. " In fact , if these premises
are true, nearlyall nine of Aquinas' proofs for the real distinction, as cata
logued by me in 2007 (based on the work of Cornelio Fabro, Leo Sweeney,
and John Wippel) succeed , avoiding the Question-Begging Objection. In
other words, they succeed if we read them as quidditatively as possi ble, not
allowing one 's " existentialist Thomism" to prescind from an authentic es
sentialism. The reader will recognize my contri bution as a sympathetic de
velopment of Dewan 's thought.
A.

PREMISE

A: I

CREATURES THERE

Is

A

REAL D ISTINCTIO_

BET\VEE - E SSENCE A D SUPPOSIT .

One will read each of Aquinas ' proofs of the famous real distinction
qui dditatively when one sees that they presuppose a prior not-so -fa mous real
distincti on: that between essence taken with precision and the who le indi
vidual su bstance or supposit. Let me begin by making a historic al point.
I must ad mit that one cannot prove textually that the D e ente presupposes
this distinction. It is implicit in D e ente 2 and 3, and D e ente 4's reasoning
does not succeed without it. But we should recall that Aquinas knows this
distinction very well from the works of Albert, including fro m the D ivine
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Names paraphrase that Thomas copies by hand circa 1250, perhaps a year
before composing the D e ente. In fact , all of the early thirteenth century Pa

risian masters held the distinction, which is nothing but Boethius ' distinction
between quo est and quod est: essence is the quo est, whereas the quod est is
the sup posit. Albert follows these masters, as Roland-Gosselin has shown. 12
In a co-authored piece in the Brill companion to Albert, I show that Albert
holds this not-so-famous distinction even when he denies the famous rea l
distinction between being and essence. 13 We find the extra-mental distinction
in texts from Aquinas 's Commentary on the Sentences written immediately
before and after the probable date of composition of D e ente. Aquinas writes,
for example: "In creatures essence differs rea lly from the supposit. ' (SN 1,
d. 5. 1. lc ; see also 3, d. 5. l.3c). So, it is very plausible that Aquinas ' mental
picture of creatures in D e ente include the "essence-supposit' rea l distinc
tion. Contemporary Aquinas scholars, myself included, have often missed
this rea l distinction under the influence of twentieth-century teaching tradi
tions such as fo und in existential or purely Aristotelian versions of Tho
mism. Thomas appeals to Avicenna as the source for this distinction (see
SN 3, d. 5. l.3c ; and Avicenna, Metaphysics of al-Shifo 5.8).
But fortunately we find in Aquinas, not only statements of, but also
a proof of the "essence-supp osit' real distinction. Although there are paral
lels, the best formulation of the proof is found in Aquinas' discussion in the
Tertia Pars as to whether the incarnation involves union with a divine per
son [or supposit] rather than with the divine nature. Again, I identify the es
sential premises in the text and itemize them below.
Aquinas, S11111111a Theofogiae III.2.2c: "[P]erson signifies something other than
nature. For, nature signifies the essence of the species that the definition signi
fies. And , if, in fact , nothing else cou ld be found adjoined to what pertains to
the notion of the species, there ll'oufd be no necessity to distinguish nature
from the supposit of the nature - which is the individua l subsisting in that na
h1re. For, [Premise (3)] [otherwise, ] each ind ividual subsisting in a nature
would be entirely the same as its nature [so, that all ind ividuals of the same na
h1re wou ld be the same individual]. However, [Premise (2)] in certain sub
sisting things there does happen to be found something that does not pertain to
the notion of [their] species, namely, [their] accidents and individuating princi
ples, just as is especially apparent in these things that are composed of matter
12 Marie-Dominique ROLAND-GOSSELIN, Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de S. Thomas d 'Aquin: texte
etabli d 'apres les manuscrits parisiens (Paris: Vrin, 1948), 172- 84.
13 Rosa VARGAS and David 1\VEITEN, "Albert on Being and Beings: The Doctrine of Esse," in
A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences, ed. Irven M. Resnick
(Leiden: Brill, 20 13), 627--48 at 646.
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and form. And, for this reason, [Premise (4)] in such things, nature and sup
posit differ even in reality, not as if they are entirely separate, 14 but because
[Premise (1): Essence Realism] the very nature of the species is included in
the supposit, and certain other things are superadded that are apart from the
intelligibility of the species." 15
AQ UINAS' PROOF OF THE " EssENCE - SUPPOSIT , REAL DISTI NCTIO. '

(I) [Essence Realism:] Two different substances that are the same in
kind must have something in them that makes them the same - by
which we name them and know them.
(2) There is something in extramental things that is individual (e.g. , indi
viduating principles such as prime matter under qu antity, individual
attributes, etc. ) that does not belong to the essence of a thing as such.
(3) Otherwise, each individual subsisting in a nature would be entirely
the same as its nature, so
(3 .10) all individuals of the same nature would be the same individual.
14 '
ot as if they are entirely separate" can be expanded by Aquinas' teaching elsewhere, e.g.,
De potential Dei 9. l c: "The essence in material substances is not the same with them in real
ity, nor is it absolutely diverse, since it stands as a formal part." [Essentia vero in substantiis
quidem materialibus non est idem cum eis secundum rem, neque penitus diversum, cum se habeat
ut pars formalis].
15 Summa theologiae ill.2 .2c: "[D]icendum quod persona aliud significat quarn natura. Natura
enim significat essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio. Et si quidem his quae ad rationem
speciei pertinent nihil aliud adiunctum inveniri posset, nulla necessitas esset distinguendi naturam
a supposito naturae, quod est individuum subsistens in natura illa, quia unumquodque individuum
subsistens in natura aliqua esset omnino idem cum sua natura. Contingit autem in quibusdam re
bus subsistentibus inveniri aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei, scilicet accidentia et
principia individuantia, sicut maxime apparel in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et
ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua sepa
rata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt
praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturarn sicut partem
forma lem et perfectivarn sui. Et propter hoc in compositis ex materia et forma natura non praedi
catur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hie homo sit sua humanitas. Si qua vero res est in qua
omnino nihil est aliud praeter rationem speciei vel naturae suae, sicut est in Deo, ibi non est aliud
secundum rem suppositum et natura, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, quia natura di
citur secundum quod est essentia quaedam; eadem vero dicitur suppositum secundum quod est
subsistens. Et quod est dictum de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in creatura rationali vel
intellectuali, quia nihil aliud est persona quam rationalis naturae individua substantia, secundum
Boetium. Omne igitur quod inest alicui personae, sive pertineat ad naturam eius sive non, unitur
ei in persona. Si ergo humana natura verbo Dei non unitur in persona, nullo modo ei unitur. Et sic
totaliter tollitur incamationis fides, quod est subruere totam fidem Christianam. Quia igitur ver
bum habet naturam humanam sibi unitarn, non autem ad suam naturam divinam pertinentem
consequens est quod unio sit facta in persona verbi, non autem in natura ."
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( 4) Therefore, essence and sup posit, the individ ual substance as a whole
[Socrates ' humanity and Socrates] are really distinct insofar as the
former excludes what individuates.
The reasoning is clear enough if one accepts Premise (1). 16 The reasoning
is based on the so-called "phenomenon of sameness and difference" in things,
and specifically on their individuating differences. Here is the point: Socrates
and his humanity are really distinct (Premise A), since human-ness is in him
[Premise 1], and human-ness excludes what makes him an individual [Prem
ise 2]; otherwise either essence would not be common [contrary to Premise
l ], or Socrates and Diotima would be the same human [Premise 3].
B.

P REMISE

B : AccORDI G TO A MEDIEVAL SEMANTIC RULE, TIIE PREDICATE " Ac
M -sT B E SAVED BY SOMETHING I THE THING THAT ACTUALL y Is.

TUALL y Is"

Before I put on display the implications of Premise A, let me introduce
the second premise, again beginning with an historical remark. The most im
portant new resource for the historical understanding of Aquinas ' philoso
phy, besides his dependence on Arabic philosophy, is the deepening appreci
ation of the thirteenth-century logic in which he is steeped . If it makes no
sense to use Gredt as the guide to the metaphysics of the historical Aquinas ,
Thomists have been slow in refusing twentieth-century manuals as a guide to
Thomas ' logic. It is instructive to see the evolution evident in Irene Rosier ' s
recent paper on thirteenth-century grammar in Robert Pasnau' s 20 10 Cam 
bridge Hisfoty of Medieval Ph ilos ophy . If fifteen years ago Ro sier called
Thomas a 'pre-modist," she now prefers simply to speak of him as a mo
dist.1 7 If Kilwardby, Albert and Roger Bacon are modists, it might be said
that Aquinas is the greatest philosopher in the modist tradition. To know
Aquinas ' logic, one must read these modist contemporaries, but especially
Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood and Lambert of Lagny. Thomistic
scholarship prior to or independent of the pioneering work of Lambertus De
Rijk in the 1950s has little chance of getting Aquinas philosophy of lan
guage right.

16 I argue for this premise dialectically in another paper, "A Defense of Classical Essentialism
behind the Essence-Esse Real Distinction: Aquinas' Doctrine of Being."
17 Irene ROSIER-CATACH, " Grammar," in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed.
Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 10), vol. 1, pp. 197-207, at 203- 6.
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Among the remarkable papers of Gyula Klima of Fordham is " The Se
mantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Be
ing." Klima seeks to lay out, after the manner of Carnap, a series of semantic
rules (in fact, five) for the thirteenth-century inherence theory of language.
Take a look at Rule 2:
(SR2) A concrete common term P is true of a particular thing u iff the
form (ultimately) signified by P is actua l in u .18
This is merely a technical expression of Aquinas' observation that predications
"per informationem" (v. ''per identitatem") are true when the predicate signifies
a form seen in (or not in) the subject (SN 3, d. 5, q. 3, a. 3 expositio). Mutatis m11tandis, predications of "actually is" can be seen as signifying formalities belong
ing to the subject (or, rather, in a unique development in Aquinas: all predicates
can be seen as esse judged to belong to a subject. 19 Klima's discussion suggests
a further corollary semantic rule:
(SR2. l ) All true affirmative predications of something in extramental reality
must be made true by something inherent in some way in the thing, or
must be reducible to some such inherent component(s) .
Whereas blindness in Stevie Wonder names a privation, his jive is re
ducible to dispositions and habits, his Afro is reducible to the quality of his
hair, and his "actually being" is saved by esse inherent in him, if it cannot be
reduced to essence (as we have seen Aquinas argue). In contrast with the
medieval theorizing, modern and contemporary semantics worries little
about what within individuals in extramental reality makes true predications
true ; about truthmakers in within our world. Given this implicit semantic
rule, Aquinas is on the hunt for what in a thing saves its esse.
C.

RETUR.N TO THE " f NTELLECTUS ESSE.lVTIAE ARGUMENT. "

In what follows , I reread the problematic "Intellect11s essentiae Argu
ment ' in light of Premises A and B, premises presupposed by Aquinas.

18 See Rosa VARGAS , Thomas Aquinas on the Apprehension of Being: The Role of Judgment in
Light of 13th C. Semantics, Ph.D. Dissertation, Marquette University, 2013, chap. 4.
19 Gyula KLIMA, "The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of
Being," M:edieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 87-1 41 , at 115.
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( 1) Humans and flamingos 20 both actually are.
( 1. 1) 'Actually to be, ' whatever it is, must be saved by something
in humans and flamingos alike. [from (S R2. l)]
(2) Humans and flamingos have within them a feature really distinct from
themselves as a whole by which they are what they are: their human
ity and flamingo-hood [from Premise A and the Proof of the "Es
sence-Supposit" Real Distinction].
(3) Humanity and fl amingo-hood contain nothing more than what belongs
to their definition, and hence do not contain "actually to be. "
(3 .1 ) Thus , one can understand humanity or flamingo -hood without
conceiving these as existing .
( 4) Therefore, humanity in existing humans and flamingo-hood in exist
ing flamingos is other than their actually existing.
In effect, what I have done is replace the first premise in De ente 4's
proof with determinations of Premises A and B. Premise A (In creatures
there is a real distinction between essence and supposit) allows me to read
the argument quidditatively. The predicates human and flamingo are pur
portedly saved by the qu iddities humanity and flamingo-hood within their
supposits : for Aquinas, humanity and flamingo-hood are truth-makers in
their respective species . Essences or quiddities within the supposits ground
the reasoning, not mental acts in us by which we understand the essence. The
epistemological act of understanding the essence can be relegated to a con
sequence that provides supporting evidence, that is to Premise (3. I). In
short, the "lntellectus essentiae Argument ' is misnamed.
Premise B (according to a medieval semantic rule, the predicate "actually
is" must be saved by something in the thing that actually is) allows the ar
gument to avoid any appearance of question-begging. We need not assume
thomistic esse as a component feature , but rather only something inherent as
a ground of the true propositions: humans and flamingos actually exist by
"actually being." But "actually being' cannot be reduced to essence, since
esse belongs to the whole, of which essence is only a part - a part that does
not contain esse.

20 I replace the phoenix with the flamingo; Klima has observed that the medievals thought
phoenixes were real, although suspect; in some parts of the world, a flamingo might be the equiv
alent. See Gyula KLJM"., "On Kenny on Aquinas on Being: A Critical Review of Aquinas on Be
ing by Anthony Kenny," International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2004) : 567-580, at 579.
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CO TCLUSION

If the proo f of the " essence-esse" real distinction is as easy as that - if
even the "Intellect11s essentiae Argument," once read quidditatively, estab
lishes a real distinction, why have these proofs caused such consternation
among Aquinas scholars? The fact is that most of us, steeped from childhood
in a scientific culture and its attendant philosophy - disparate shards of
classical thought inherited, in the manner of Leibowitz, by through the
moderns - have not learned to worry about semantic rules: what in reality
saves the truth of our predications? Most of us, even most of Aquinas schol
ars, are presumptive nominalists about rea l essences, and we associate "Es
sence Realism ' with Scotus, not Aquinas. Or, if we affirm it, we do not ap
peal to Aquinas ' proof of essence realism, or of the "essence-supposit ' real
distinction, as a foundation for the " essence-esse' real distinction. My con
jecture is that in the enthusiasm for existentialism, which helped Gilson and
Fabro correctly red iscover esse in a 20 th -century context, they also adopted,
perhaps unwittingly, an anti-essentialism that makes the "funda mental
claims" of Aquinas ' philosophy difficult to defend. An anti-essentiali st will
sometimes deny, for example that God has an essence, thinking that es
sences are finite .21 Similarly, an anti-essentialist reading takes Thomas to
hold tha t essence in itself is j ust nothing, since in itself it has no being (actus
essendi) .22 Engaging with contemporary semantics helps one understand the
advantages of moderate realist essentialism. Encouraged by Dewan's quid
ditative ' existentialism and equipped by some thirteenth-century semantic
principles, one may appropriate "the foundational truth of Judaeo-Christian
Arabic philosophy," to paraphrase Cajetan, Del Prado and Gilson: the real
distinction between esse and essence in all things but one. 23
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HOW SA VE AQ INAS ' "INTELLECTUS ESSENTIAE ARGUMENT"
FOR THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSE CE AND ESSE?
Summary
Aquinas ' so-called "Intellectus essentiae Argument" for the distinction between being and
essence is notoriously suspect, including among defenders of Aquinas' distinction. For the pa
per in this volume, I take as my starting point the recent defense of the argument by Fr. Law
rence Dewan, O.P. Fr. Dewan 's project is unsuccessful . Yet, pointing out some shortcomings
in his readings allows me to take up his call to highlight the "formal" or "quidditative side" of
Aquinas' metaphysics, in this case in regards to the proofs of the "real distinction. " According
ly, the second half of this paper sets forth a way in which the famous "lntellectus essentiae Ar
gument" of De Ente et Essentia 4 can succeed as a proof of the real distinction. Aquinas ' argu
ment presupposes the prior real distinction between essence and supposit or individual substance.
Esse is the ontological component that makes true our judgments that substances actually are:
Obama exists. By contrast, this "truth-maker" cannot be predicated of humanity, although it is in
Obama as really distinct from him. If Aquinas' reasoning in this most contentious of his proofs
can be saved, so, perhaps, can most of his other proofs.

JAK OCALIC AKWINATY ,,ARGUME T INTELLECTUS ESSENTIAE'
ZA REALN}\ ROZNIC}\ MI~DZY ISTOT;\ I ESSE?
Streszczenie
Tak zwany argument intellectus essentiae Ah.'"winaty za rea1n<1 r6inic<1 rni~dzy bytem a istot,'j
j est powszechnie podawany w W,'jtpliwose, w tym takie w kr~gu obronc6w tego rozr6inienia
Ak\vinaty. W artykule zawartym w niniejszym tomie za punkt wyjscia bior~ ostatni<1 obron~ tego
argumentu przez o. Lawrence'a Dewana OP. Proj ekt o. Dewana konczy si~ niepowodzeniem.
Wskazanie pewnych niedoci,'jgni~c w jego twierdzeniach pozwala mi podj,'j6 jego wezwanie do
podkreslenia ,,formalnej " lub ,,istotnosciowej" strony metafizyki Ak\vinaty, w tym przypadk'"U
w odniesieniu do dowod6w za ,,realn<1 r6inicf'. Druga cz~sc tego artykulu przedstawia, w jaki
spos6b slynny ,,argument intellectus essentiae" z De ente et essentia 4 moie zostae uznany za do
w6d realnej r6inicy. Argument Akwinaty zaklada wczesniejsz<1 realnq r6znicf? mi~dzy esencjq
i suppositum lub pojedyncz,'j substancj,'j . Esse jest skladnikiem ontologicznym, kt6ry potwierdza
nasze OS,'jdy, ie substancje faktycznie S,'j: Obama istnieje. Z kolei 6w ,,uprawdziwiacz" nie moie
bye przypisany ludzkosci, chociai w Obamie jest tak naprawd~ czyms odr~bnym od niego. Jesli
rommowanie Akwinaty w tym najbardziej kontrowersyjnym z jego dowod6w moie zostac oca
lone, bye moie ocalie moina takie wiele innych jego dowod6w.
Przeloiyl Stanislaw Sarek
Key words: Aquinas; "Intellectus essentiae Argument"; esse; essence; LawTence Dewan.
Slowa kluczowe: Akwinata; ,,argument Intellectus essentiae"; esse; istota; Lawrence Dewan.
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